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Disasters can create the equivalent of 20 years of waste in only a few days.  Disaster waste 
can have direct impacts on public health and safety, and on the environment.  The 
management of such waste has a great direct cost to society in terms of labor, equipment, 
processing, transport and disposal.  Disaster waste management also has indirect costs, in 
the sense that slow management can slow down a recovery, greatly affecting the ability of 
commerce and industry to re-start.  In addition, a disaster can lead to the disruption of 
normal solid waste management systems, or result in inappropriate management that leads 
to expensive environmental remediation. Finally, there are social impacts implicit in disaster 
waste management decisions because of psychological impact we expect when waste is not 
cleared quickly or is cleared too quickly.  The paper gives an overview of the challenge of 
disaster waste management, examining issues of waste quantity and composition; waste 
treatment; environmental, economic, and social impacts; health and safety matters; and 
planning. 
 
Christchurch, New Zealand, and the broader region of Canterbury were impacted during this 
research by a series of shallow earthquakes. This has led to the largest natural disaster 
emergency in New Zealand’s history, and the management of approximately 8 million tons of 
building and infrastructure debris has become a major issue.  The paper provides an 
overview of the status of disaster waste management in Christchurch as a case study. 
 
A key conclusion is the vital role of planning in effective disaster waste management.  In 
spite of the frequency of disasters, in most countries the ratio of time spent on planning for 
disaster waste management to the time spent on normal waste management is extremely 
low.  Disaster waste management also requires improved education or training of those 
involved in response efforts.  All solid waste professionals have a role to play to respond to 





The planning, design, and operation of solid waste management systems are complex tasks 
requiring substantial effort and attention by communities.  After a disaster, solid waste 
management takes on greater importance and is also more difficult to accomplish.  Solid 
waste management is connected to every part of the response and recovery of a community 
after a disaster.  Failure of solid waste management systems after disasters can lead to 
major social problems, far outweighing the problems caused by inadequate solid waste 
management before the disaster.  Awareness, planning, and training all have important 
roles to play for those solid waste professionals who will be called upon to manage after a 
disaster. 
 
Disasters come in many forms, both man-made and natural—fire, flood, earthquake, tsunami, 
hurricane/cyclone, tornado, volcanic eruption, severe drought, civil conflict, war.  Each has 
its particular characteristics, which means that planning and training for each is distinct. A 
number of general features of all disaster types can be highlighted, and these will be the 
focus of this paper. 
 
This paper draws heavily on a recent literature review on disaster waste management 
published in Waste Management (Brown, Milke, and Seville, 2011a).  That article has 120 
references from a wide variety of sources, and is the first journal-standard review of the topic.  
Other key overview reports related to disaster waste management exist, the most notable of 
which are the 2008 USEPA report “Planning for Natural Disaster Debris” (USEPA, 2008) and 
the 2011 UNEP/OCHA report “Disaster Waste Management Guidelines” (UNEP, 2011). 
 
Christchurch, New Zealand, and the larger region of Canterbury (total impacted population of 
roughly 400,000) have experienced, since 3 September 2010, a series of strong, shallow 
earthquakes on faults that had not previously been identified.  The nearness of the 
earthquakes to the urban area has led to severe impacts, with 181 deaths, an estimated 
10,000 to 15,000 houses that will need to be demolished, in excess of 1000 (mostly multi-
storied) commercial buildings to be demolished, upwards of 200,000 tons of contaminated 
silt/sand from liquefaction, and major damage to infrastructure for water supply, sewage, 
stormwater, electricity, and roads. The most serious event was a 6.3 magnitude earthquake 
on 22 February 2011, centered only 5 to 10 km from the city center.  This earthquake 
generated some of the highest accelerations ever recorded in an urban area (see Figure 1), 
and the largest natural disaster emergency in New Zealand’s history.  Major issues of solid 
waste management resulted; overall, an estimated 8 million tons of building and 
infrastructure debris were created.  The cost to insurers for rebuilding is estimated at NZ$15 
billion, making it the third costliest earthquake ever, worldwide.  The relative cost of 6 to 8% 
of GDP is very high for any natural disaster faced by a country of New Zealand’s size (a little 






Figure 1:  Maximum accelerations experienced in Christchurch, New Zealand, 
during the magnitude 6.3 earthquake on 22 February 2011 (Royal Society of New 





WASTE QUANTITIES AND COMPOSITION 
The quantities and composition of waste can vary dramatically between disasters as a 
function of the type of disaster, the size of the disaster, and the development status of the 
country.  Some reported quantities are provided in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Reported Waste Quantities from Previous Disasters (Brown, Milke, and 
Seville, 2011a) 
Year Event Estimated Waste Quantities 
2011 Christchurch earthquake 8 million tons 
2010 Haiti earthquake 23 to 60 million tons 
2009 L’Aquila earthquake, Italy  1.5 to 3 million tons 
2008 Sichuan earthquake , China 20 million tons 
2005 Hurricane Katrina, USA 76 million cubic metres 
2004 Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne, Florida, USA 3 million cubic metres 
2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami (Indonesia alone) 10 million cubic metres 
1999 Marmara Earthquake, Turkey 13 million tons 
1995 Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, Kobe, Japan 15 million tons 
 
 
The largest component of the waste can be classified as similar to construction and 
demolition waste, although the waste can have fractions such as vehicles and vessels, 
industrial chemicals, and human and animal corpses.  There can also be uniquely post-
disaster waste fractions such as unwanted donations, rotten food because of power outages, 
and packaging for relief food. 
 
Waste from hurricanes and cyclones tends to be higher in vegetative debris than that from 
other disaster types, waste from floods is higher in building contents (e.g., carpets), and 
waste from earthquakes is higher in building materials (concrete, timber) and infrastructure 
materials (e.g., paving, piping). 
 
Appropriate planning post-disaster requires a sensible estimate of both the quantity of waste 
and its composition.  Because recycling/recovery options can require large infusion of new 
capital plant, we need to estimate the economic viability of particular recycling/recovery 
options, and so we require estimates of quantities and composition.  Estimation of these can 
be difficult immediately after a disaster when there are high demands on key people. If the 
estimation is left until the community is ready to clean up and good data are available, it can 
mean long delays between the disaster and the time when clean-up begins. After estimates 
of quantities, composition, and cost are completed, time is needed to obtain equipment, 
assess effects, write contracts, set prices, and obtain approval.  To avoid long delays, post-
disaster estimation of waste quantity and composition needs to be closely tied to pre-disaster 
planning. 
 
Christchurch has an estimated 8 million tons of waste generated by the earthquakes.  An 
unuusally large fraction (20-50%) will likely be infrastructure waste.  Liquefaction has 
caused the need to demolish whole residential areas.  Not only homes will need to be 
removed, but also their associated streets, curbs, drinking water pipes, sewer pipes, and 
electrical systems.  For example, 300 km of sewer pipes were damaged.  Although much 
of these materials can be reused, a large fraction has been badly damaged or is 
contaminated to the point where reuse is impractical.  The Christchurch region typically 
generates roughly 400,000 tons of waste per year, and so the earthquakes have created 





The choices for waste treatment do not change after a disaster.  What does change is the 
large quantities of specific materials (e.g., gypsum wallboard, treated timber). On the one 
hand, these large quantities can make certain treatment options more economically 
favorable; on the other hand, they also worsen issues of waste storage and market 
saturation.  The amount of separation of waste materials is still a critical decision for waste 
managers.  The large quantities allow for bigger operations and also greater assurance that 
any processing facility will operate at capacity for a fixed duration, both of which will improve 
the economics.  Although reconstruction creates demand for certain materials, such as 
roading aggregate, the timing of recovery can often mean that a large stockpile of materials 
must be kept (and properly managed) over a lengthy recovery phase.  The combination of a 
need to process materials and the need to stockpile has led to many authors noting the 
importance of temporary staging areas for disaster waste (FEMA, 2007; USEPA, 2008). 
 
After a disaster, waste treatment decisions are frequently not enacted quickly because of 
pre-disaster environmental and waste regulations.  If the ability to enact waste management 
decisions is slow before a disaster, the many social demands afterwards are likely to slow 
matters further unless emergency powers, through some form of waivers, are granted.  A 
key factor in allowing rapid implementation of new waste services is effective public 
consultation.  Again, public consultation can be slow and disputatious before a disaster, and 
only becomes more difficult afterwards; however, some manner of public consultation can 
help communities find reasonable emergency measures to handle a waste management 
crisis.  Without any consultation, the likelihood of disagreement is high, and the potential 
increases for public protests and court cases that would stop implementation. 
 
Brown, Milke, and Seville (2011b) describes the response of Australian authorities after the 
2009 Australian bushfires to the demand for new landfill space.  After quick consultation 
with various parties, a new landfill cell alongside an existing landfill was agreed as the best 
way forward. Design, regulatory approval, and construction all occurred within 10 days of the 
joint decision.   
 
In Christchurch, the community has opted for a common waste processing site in order to 
improve the economics of waste processing, and to also allow for rapid movement of wastes 
away from urban areas.  Although the community had not previously agreed on a suitable 
site, there was fortunately land nearby that proved appropriate.  Much of the waste would 
seem to be economically recoverable, although a need for storage of waste-derived products 
will be necessary.  There is still discussion about what level of landfill protection is 
appropriate for the non-recoverable residue.  Six months after the February event, the 
demolition of buildings and infrastructure is picking up in pace, and the waste processing 
capacity is struggling to keep up, leading to storage of unprocessed waste.  One significant 
challenge that remains is to agree on an appropriate treatment for treated timber removed 
from buildings during demolition.   
 
 
HEALTH AND SAFETY 
Health and safety issues are complicated enough for waste managers before a disaster; after 
a disaster they can only become worse.  There is an inevitable human desire to take 
emergency action in a crisis, even if that leads to riskier waste management practices.  And 
there is a societal need to clean up the waste quickly, along with a desire to relax certain pre-
existing regulations for short periods of time.  When is it reasonable to relax rules, and when 
is it not? 
 
Health and safety can be a concern because of (1) the disaster waste itself (e.g., spoiled 
food leading to proliferation of disease vectors), (2) the public impact of improper waste 
management (open burning of waste), or (3) the impacts on waste management workers 
(fine particulates from grinding of waste concrete).  Decisions made in haste can lead to 
long-term regrets, such as the health impacts increasingly noted in emergency responders 
and clean-up workers in the aftermath of the 2001 World Trade Center collapses (Landrigan, 
et al., 2004). 
 
The most likely pressure point for health and safety concerns in disaster waste management 
are the issues of fine particulates and, in particular, asbestos exposure.  In many developed 
countries, asbestos removal from buildings during demolition requires trained personnel and 
can take days for relatively small buildings.  When one extrapolates normal conditions to 
thousands of buildings after a disaster, the cost and delays can seem enormous.  
Significant research is needed on appropriate responses to asbestos hazards after disasters, 
and how to plan for those responses now. 
 
The greatest tension in the Christchurch situation has been related to the potential health 
and safety impacts on demolition and waste workers. This becomes a factor in the choice of 
a centralized or decentralized approach to disaster clean-up.  In a decentralized approach, 
property owners (or more likely, their insurers) negotiate demolition and clean-up contracts 
with individual companies; while in a centralized approach, all work must be done through 
one contractor.  Some companies that might be excluded from a centralized contract could 
push for a decentralized approach by stating that they can provide the service at a lower cost.  
If a decentralized approach proceeds under these terms, the risk of health and safety 
violations by one of the many small companies, each under intense cost pressure, could be 
unacceptably high.  The Christchurch decision has been to provide a choice of either a 
centralized contractor or for independent work, and this will require diligent monitoring of 




The large impact that disaster waste management has on the overall disaster recovery 
process has been appreciated only in recent years.  Previously, emergency response and 
recovery managers had identified the critical infrastructure or ‘lifelines’ and their inter-
relationships (Centre for Advanced Engineering, 1991). This earlier work focused on roads, 
bridges, sewage pump stations, etc., as key chokepoints in an infrastructure system that, 
through various interrelations with other infrastructure subsystems, can constrain recovery 
speeds.  In a more subtle way, waste management after a disaster can also seriously 
impede the speed of recovery, and so should be seen as a ‘lifeline service’.   
 
We analyzed the likely relative importance of various lifeline services after a large 
earthquake in the New Zealand capital city of Wellington (Brown, Milke, and Seville, 2010b).  
Some key conclusions were: 
• Although of low importance during the immediate response, waste management is 
likely to increase in importance during the recovery phase and reach a higher level of 
importance than some services such as communications and airports. 
• Not only disaster debris but also day-to-day municipal waste management needs to 
be considered in pre-disaster planning. 
• Waste management after a disaster is closely tied to a number of other infrastructure 
services, in particular roads and stormwater management, and therefore good waste 
management is important to avoid poor functioning of key sub-systems. 
 
The indirect impacts of disaster waste extend beyond the impact on lifeline services.  There 
is a recognized economic impact of slow recovery, and poor disaster waste management has 
been cited as a key obstacle to post-disaster economic recovery.  Unfortunately, there are 
no good methods to estimate the avoidable economic impact of inefficient waste 
management, and so there is no economic justification available for a higher priority to 
disaster waste management. 
 
The indirect impacts extend beyond economics to a wide variety of social impacts.  Clean-
up after a disaster can provide jobs for people displaced from their typical employment.  
This can be especially important in developing countries where government support systems 
are weak or non-existent. Slow management of disaster waste can lead to serious issues of 
public protest, which can encourage poor practices such as open burning of waste.  Public 
participation in disaster waste management can have a psychological benefit on a 
community allowing it to feel that progress is being made to recovery and that people have 
made individual contributions at a time of great personal frustration.  The challenge facing 
those who want more public participation is how to allow that without unduly increasing 
health and safety risks. 
 
Solid waste managers also need to be aware of the attachment of owners to personal 
property and must facilitate recovery of personal goods. This might imply a need to provide 
an opportunity for property owners to be aware of (or perhaps participate in) necessary 
demolition and clean-up.  Finally, the difficult issue of public communication and 
consultation becomes even more difficult and important after a disaster.  Much more 
investigation is needed into the social impacts of disaster waste management. 
 
In Christchurch, there has been relatively quick and strong recognition of the potential impact 
of disaster waste on long-term recovery.  There has also been strong recognition by central 
government of an economic and social need for quick recovery, and this has led to support 
for rules and processes that allow for quicker demolition and clean-up, even if at slightly 
higher direct costs.  The greatest difficulties so far in this regard, in my opinion, have been 
weak public consultation and weak empathy for local residents wishing to have more 
involvement in clean-up.  Consultation proved difficult during the early period after the large 
February earthquake because of poor electricity service, and no postal service.  Traditional 
methods of communication and consultation proved ineffective, and no pre-existing 
alternatives (eg, neighborhood action groups) were able to fill the gap.  The weak empathy 
noted by some residents and business owners seems to be a result of a strong emphasis by 
authorities on enforcing rigorous safety rules, perhaps even more rigorous than existed 





There is a strong recognition of the need for pre-disaster planning of disaster waste 
management.  The United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have had planning systems in place; 
however, the massive scale of waste problems after Hurricane Katrina highlighted a number 
of deficiencies that have since been improved.  One strong component to US planning has 
been the negotiation of pre-arranged contracts and costs with contractors.  One weakness 
in these plans is that they give little guidance on decision-making processes.  They also do 
not consider the effectiveness of different organizational, financial, and legal arrangements in 
various disaster recovery situations. 
 
The use of single contractors for managing all, or significant sub-fractions, of disaster waste 
is an increasingly common organizational response.  The use of single contractors ensures 
co-ordination and government oversight without direct day-to-day management by an often 
overwhelmed local or regional governmental entity. 
 
Solid waste management is governed by a multitude of laws and regulations, with great 
variability between locations.  This complexity makes it difficult to discuss common issues.  
Still, it is important to recognize that the local legal environment can have a strong control 
over local management of disaster waste.  Careful study of existing laws and regulations is 
needed during the planning phase to identify legal means to facilitate good decisions related 
to disaster waste management.  This is likely to mean a need in legislation for emergency 
powers that can override certain regulations under well defined conditions. 
 
In our study of the relevant New Zealand legislation, 17 pieces of relevant legislation were 
identified (Brown, Milke, and Seville, 2010a).  Many, but not all, had emergency provisions 
that could allow for facilitated disaster waste management.  The largest deficiency noted 
was any system for managing long-term liability for adverse effects resulting from acting 
under emergency powers.  When faced with a decision on waste treatment or disposal 
under difficult and urgent post-disaster conditions, there could be little use of emergency 
powers without some form of at least partial protection for negative effects. 
 
In the Christchurch situation, even with relatively strong legislation in place, the New Zealand 
Parliament saw a need for new urgent legislation. The Canterbury Earthquake Response and 
Recovery Act (CERRA) established the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) 
(New Zealand Government, 2011).  The legislation gives CERA strong powers to override a 
large number of regulations.  This has been the subject of substantial legal debate (New 
Zealand Law Society, 2011), with some commenting that it provides too much power and too 
little opportunity for consultation or public comment.  To date, there has been no great 
uproar over excessive use of these exceptional powers, though the concern still exists. 
 
Negotiation with insurers and reinsurers has become an important planning task in the 
aftermath of the Christchurch earthquakes.  The policies that insurers have with property 
owners will pay for only the lowest cost required, even though this might cause long delays in 
recovery, or interfere with joint rebuilding with other property owners and their various 
insurers.  Because of this, the government and CERA have advanced negotiations to find 
ways to speed up removal of debris and also allow quicker rebuilding.  The negotiation with 
insurers became an aspect of recovery where, in hindsight, more planning had been needed. 
 
The large impact on infrastructure over a wide area has implied major challenges in restoring 
roads, sewers, electricity, and so on.  Before the disaster, various organizations would 
specialize in each of these services and look at their interrelationships as needed.  After the 
disaster, that piecemeal approach would not work and instead the city has agreed on an 
Alliance contract involving five construction companies, the City Council and CERA (CERA, 
2011).  This should bring the expertise of each organization to the project, reduce 





A key conclusion is the vital role of planning in effective disaster waste management.  In 
spite of the frequency of disasters, the ratio of time spent on planning for disaster waste 
management to the time spent on normal waste management is extremely low in most 
countries.  Planning requires governments to face difficult decisions that might not become 
relevant for many years, if at all.  It can be difficult enough for society to accept a waste 
disposal siting decision when waste piles up on the street; one can imagine how difficult it 
can be to agree on a waste processing or disposal site in advance of a disaster that might 
not occur in people’s lifetimes.  Similarly, the tough thinking, consultation, and negotiating 
that goes with disaster planning can be too easily put off for another day.  However, when 
the day comes that recovery plans are needed, society will turn to waste managers and 
expect quick and appropriate solutions.  As waste professionals, we have a strong duty to 
engage now in thorough planning. 
 
Effective planning is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition, for achieving good 
disaster waste management.  Another key condition is the employment of well educated 
and well trained individuals who can participate in the decision-making.  The disaster 
response team needs to have knowledgeable waste management professionals and an 
ability to call on foreign expertise.  We cannot wait and educate the people needed after a 
disaster strikes-- the lack of well educated solid waste professionals in a region can be sadly 
exposed by a disaster.  In addition, civil defense drills and exercises need to include solid 
waste aspects.  These will highlight the need for the presence of solid waste professionals 
in civil defense teams, and also the need for short-courses to increase awareness of solid 
waste issues by civil defense staff. 
 
Compared with excellent day-to-day solid waste management in many places around the 
world, disaster waste management is an unmet challenge for solid waste professionals.  
Much research into the topic is needed, and every year its urgency increases.  The 
increased urbanization in developing countries has greatly increased the world’s risk of 
massive disasters, and concomitant massive solid waste management crises.  Even in 
developed countries, the increased investment in infrastructure and the complex 
interrelationships of infrastructure services have made solid waste management a key 
dimension to recovery and rebuild after disasters.  We all have a role to play and a 
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